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Abstract
We analyzed quantum version of the game Battle of Sexes using a
general initial quantum state. For a particular choice of initial entangled
quantum state it is shown that the classical dilemma of the Battle of Sexes
can be resolved and a unique solution of the game can be obtained.
1 Introduction
Game theory deals with situations where two or more players compete to max-
imize their respective payoff or gain. Their interaction is strategic in nature as
their gain depends on the strategy adopted by other player/players [1]. In the
games with complete information, players decide their strategy on the basis of
payoff matrix, known to them. Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a key concept, which
is a set of strategies from which unilateral deviation by a player reduces his/her
payoff [2].
In an important two player game, Battle of Sexes, Alice and Bob try to
decide a place to spend Saturday evening together. Alice wants to go for the
Opera and Bob is interested in watching TV while both prefer to spend their
evening together. The two NE of the game correspond to situations when both
the players choose either Opera or TV. Alice prefers NE based on Opera and
Bob prefers the other NE. In absence of any communication the two players
face a dilemma in choosing between the two NE and could inadvertently end up
with mismatch strategies. This mismatched strategy results in a loss for both
the players as they will not be able to spend the evening together and termed
as the worst payoff for both the players.
Extension of game theory to quantum domain [3] leads to some interest-
ing new results in addition to the resolution of some existing dilemmas in the
classical versions of games. In quantum game theory an initial quantum state
is prepared by the arbiter and passed on to the players. After applying their
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respective local operators (or strategies) they return it to the arbiter who then
determines their payoffs. Initial quantum state plays a crucial role and interest-
ing results are obtained for initially entangled quantum states. Since players
are equipped with local operators they are unable to determine the complete
initial quantum state given to them and hence choose their strategies to maxi-
mize their payoff on the basis of payoff matrix known to them. In an interesting
example, Eisert et. al. [4] examined the game Prisoner Dilemma, in quantum
domain and showed that the dilemma which exists in the classical version of the
game does not exist in quantum version. Further they constructed a quantum
strategy which always wins over any classical strategy. Inspired by their work,
Marinatto and Weber [5] proposed another interesting scheme to quantize the
game of Battle of Sexes. They introduced Hilbert structure to the strategic
space of the game and argued that if the players are allowed to play quantum
strategies involving unitary operators then the game has a unique solution, and
the dilemma could be resolved. They used maximally entangled initial quan-
tum state, and allowed the players to play strategies which are combination of
the identity operator I and the flip operator C, with classical probabilities p∗
and (1− p∗) for Alice and q∗ and (1− q∗) for Bob. In the quantum version of
the game maximum payoff is obtained for the two pure NE, (p∗ = q∗ = 1) or
(1, 1) and (0, 0). In Marinatto and Weber scheme both NE corresponds to equal
payoff and hence they argued that the classical dilemma is no longer there as
both the solutions or NE are equally good for the two players.
In an interesting comment Benjamin [6] pointed out that the dilemma still
exists as the same payoff for the two NE make them equally acceptable to both
the players and there is no way for them to prefer ”1” over ”0” , in absence of any
communication between them. He argued that the players still face some what
similar dilemma as they could still end up with a situation (1, 0) or (0, 1) which
corresponds to the worst payoff for the both. In their response to Benjamin’s
comment, Marinatto and Weber [7] insisted that since both the NE (0, 0) and
(1, 1) render the initial quantum state unchanged and corresponds to equal and
maximum payoff for both the players, therefore, both the players would prefer
(1, 1) , as by choosing p or q equal to zero there is a danger for both the payers
to get in to a situation (1, 0) or (0, 1) which corresponds to the lowest payoff.
However, choosing strategy on this argument requires complete information of
the initial quantum state and in quantum games players can not measure the
initial quantum state[8] [9][10].
In this paper we consider a general initial quantum state and present a condi-
tion on the parameters of the initial quantum state for which classical dilemma
can be resolved and a unique solution of the quantum Battle of Sexes can be
obtained. In comparison to Marinatto and Weber [5] we presented a condition
for which payoffs corresponding to “mismatched or worst case situation” are
different for the two players which results in a unique solution of the game.
Classical and quantum versions of the game of Battle of Sexes are presented
in Section 2. Here we restrict our analysis to pure strategies only as classical
dilemma deals with these strategies only.
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2 Battle of Sexes
2.1 Classical Form
Battle of Sexes is an interesting static game. In the usual exposition of this
game two players Alice and Bob try to decide a place to spend Saturday evening
together. Alice wants to go for the Opera while Bob is interested in watching TV
and both would like to be together. The game is represented by the following
payoff matrix
Alice
O
T
Bob
O T[
(α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)
]
, (1)
where O and T represent Opera and TV, respectively. The elements α, β, γ
are the payoffs for the players corresponding to the choices available to them
with α > β > γ. The two pure NE of this game are (O,O) and (T, T ) which
corresponds to the situation when both the players choose Opera and TV, re-
spectively. Here the first NE is more favorable to Alice while the second NE
is favorable to Bob. Since the players are not allowed to communicate, they
face a dilemma in choosing their strategy. The strategy pairs (O, T ) and (T,O)
correspond to the worst-case payoff for the two players, i.e., both the players
gets the minimum possible payoff γ. There also exists a mixed NE for this game
but we are not interested in it here.
2.2 Quantum Form
In the quantum version of the game both players, Alice and Bob, apply their
respective strategy on the initial quantum state given to them on the basis of
payoff matrix known to them. In this approach the payoff matrix depends on
the initial state and can be controlled by the parameters of the initial quantum
state. Our choice of general initial quantum state provide us with additional
parameters to control the game in comparison to Marinatto and Webers [5].
Let Alice and Bob have the following initial entangled quantum state at their
disposal:
|ψin〉 = a |OO〉 + b |OT 〉+ c |TO〉+ d |TT 〉 , (2)
where |a|
2
+ |b|
2
+ |c|
2
+ |d|
2
= 1. Here the first entry in ket |〉 is for Alice and
the second for Bob’s strategy. For b and c equal to zero, the eq. (2) reduces
to the initial entangled quantum state used by Marinatto and Weber [5]. The
unitary operators at the disposal of the two players are defined as:
C |O〉 = |T 〉 , C |T 〉 = |O〉 , C = C† = C−1,
I |O〉 = |O〉 , I |T 〉 = |I〉 , I = I† = I−1. (3)
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Following the Marinatto and Weber’s approach, take pI + (1− p)C and qI +
(1− q)C as the strategies for the two players, respectively, with p and q being
the classical probabilities for using the identity operator I. The final density
matrix takes the form:
ρf = pqIA ⊗ IBρinI
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + p(1− q)IA ⊗ CBρinI
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
+q(1− p)CA ⊗ IBρinC
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + (1− p)(1− q)CA ⊗ CBρinC
†
A ⊗ C
†
B . (4)
Here ρin = |ψin〉 〈ψin| which can be obtained through the eq. (2) (See Appendix
A). The corresponding payoff operators for Alice and Bob are:
PA = α |OO〉 〈OO|+ β |TT 〉 〈TT |+ γ(|OT 〉 〈OT |+ |TO〉 〈TO|), (5)
PB = β |OO〉 〈OO|+ α |TT 〉 〈TT |+ γ(|OT 〉 〈OT |+ |TO〉 〈TO|), (6)
and the payoff functions (the mean values of these operators, i.e., $A(p, q) =
Trace[PAρf ] and $B(p, q) =Trace[PBρf ]) are obtained by using eqs. (3,4,5,6)
and are given as
$A(p, q) = p
[
qΩ+ Φ
(
|b|
2
− |d|
2
)
+ Λ
(
|c|
2
− |a|
2
)]
+q
[
Λ
(
|b|
2
− |a|
2
)
+Φ
(
|c|
2
− |d|
2
)]
+Θ, (7)
$B(p, q) = q
[
pΩ + Φ
(
|b|
2
− |a|
2
)
+ Λ
(
|c|
2
− |d|
2
)]
+p
[
Λ
(
|b|
2
− |d|
2
)
+ Φ
(
|c|
2
− |a|
2
)]
+Θ. (8)
In writing above equations we have used defined
Ω = (α+ β − 2γ)(|a|
2
− |b|
2
− |c|
2
+ |d|
2
),
Φ = (α− γ), Λ = (β − γ),
Θ = α |d|
2
+ γ |c|
2
+ γ |b|
2
+ β |a|
2
. (9)
The NE of the game are found by solving the following two inequalities:
$A(p
∗, q∗)− $A(p, q
∗) ≥ 0,
$B(p
∗, q∗)− $B(p, q
∗) ≥ 0, (10)
that lead to the following two conditions, respectively:
(p∗ − p)[q∗(α+ β − 2γ)(|a|
2
− |b|
2
− |c|
2
+ |d|
2
)+
(γ − β) |a|2 + (α− γ) |b|2 + (β − γ) |c|2 + (γ − α) |d|2] ≥ 0, (11)
and
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(q∗ − q)[p∗(α+ β − 2γ)(|a|2 − |b|2 − |c|2 + |d|2)+
(γ − α) |a|
2
+ (α− γ) |b|
2
+ (β − γ) |c|
2
+ (γ − β) |d|
2
] ≥ 0. (12)
The above two inequalities are satisfied if both the factors have the same sign.
Here we are interested in solving the dilemma arising due to pure strategies, i.e.
(1, 1) and (0, 0), therefore, we restrict ourselves to the following possible pure
strategies pairs:
Case (a) When p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0 then the inequalities (11) and (12), reduce
to
(γ − β) |a|
2
+ (α − γ) |b|
2
+ (β − γ) |c|
2
+ (γ − α) |d|
2
< 0,
(γ − α) |a|
2
+ (α − γ) |b|
2
+ (β − γ) |c|
2
+ (γ − β) |d|
2
] < 0. (13)
All those values of the initial quantum state parameters for which above inequal-
ities are satisfied, strategy pair (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium. Here we consider a
particular set of values for the initial state parameters for which a unique solu-
tion of the game can be found and hence dilemma would be resolved, however,
this choice is not unique. Lets take
|a|
2
= |d|
2
= |b|
2
=
5
16
, |c|
2
=
1
16
. (14)
Corresponding payoffs can be obtained from Eqs. (7) and (8) are
$A(0, 0) =
5α+ 5β + 6γ
16
,
$B(0, 0) =
5α+ 5β + 6γ
16
. (15)
Physically it means that for the NE (0, 0) , two players get equal payoff corre-
sponding to the choice of initial state parameters given by the eq.(14).
Case (b): When p∗ = q∗ = 1, then the inequalities (11) and (12), become,
(α − γ) |a|
2
+ (γ − β) |b|
2
+ (γ − α) |c|
2
+ (β − γ) |d|
2
> 0,
(β − γ) |a|2 + (γ − β) |b|2 + (γ − α) |c|2 + (α− γ) |d|2 > 0. (16)
These inequalities are again satisfied for the choice of parameters given in the
eq. (14) for the initial quantum state and the strategy pair (1, 1) is also a NE.
Corresponding payoffs for the two players in this case are:
$A(1, 1) =
5α+ 5β + 6γ
16
,
$B(1, 1) =
5α+ 5β + 6γ
16
. (17)
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For the mismatched strategy pairs, i.e., (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) and (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0)
the inequalities (11) and (12) are not satisfied for the choice of initial state pa-
rameters given by the eq. (14), hence these strategy pairs are not NE. However,
it is interesting to note the corresponding payoffs for the two players, i.e.,
$A(0, 1) =
α+ 5β + 10γ
16
, $B(0, 1) =
5α+ β + 10γ
16
,
$A(1, 0) =
5α+ β + 10γ
16
, $B(1, 0) =
α+ 5β + 10γ
16
. (18)
Now keeping in view all the payoffs given by Eqs. (15,17,18), under the choice
(14), the quantum game can be represented by the following payoff matrix:
Alice
p = 1
p = 0
Bob
q = 1 q = 0[
(α′, α′) (β′, γ′)(
γ′, β′
)
(α′, α′)
]
, (19)
where
α′ =
5α+ 5β + 6γ
16
,
β′ =
5α+ β + 10γ
16
,
γ′ =
α+ 5β + 10γ
16
, (20)
with α′ > β′ > γ′. On the other hand, quantized version of Marinatto and
Weber [5] can be represented by the following payoff matrix:
Alice
p = 1
p = 0
Bob
q = 1 q = 0[ (
α+β
2
, α+β
2
)
(γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (α+β
2
, α+β
2
)
]
. (21)
In comparison to classical version payoffmatrix, i.e., eq. (1), both Marinatto and
Weber’s payoff matrix (21) and our payoff matrix (19) shows a clear advantage
over the classical version as the payoffs for the two players are same for the two
pure NE in quantum versions of the game. Hence there is no incentive for the two
players to prefer one NE over the other. However, as pointed out by Benjamin
[6], in the Marinatto’s quantum version, in absence of any communication the
two players could inadvertently end up with a mismatched strategies, i.e., (1, 0)
or (0, 1) which corresponds to minimum possible payoff, i.e., γ, for both the
players. It is important to note that in our version of the quantum Battle of
Sexes the payoffs corresponding to worst-case situation are different for the two
players. This particular feature leads to a unique solution for the game by
providing a straight forward reason for rational players to go for one of the NE,
i.e., (1, 1) for the particular choice of parameters given by the eq. (14).
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It can be seen from the payoff matrix (19), that the payoff for the two
players is maximum for the two NE, (0, 0) and (1, 1), but for Alice the rational
choice is p∗ = 1 since her payoff is maximum, i.e., α′, when Bob decides to play
q∗ = 1 and equals to β′ if Bob decides to play q∗ = 0, which is higher than the
worst possible payoff, i.e., γ′. In a similar manner for Bob the rational choice
is q∗ = 1 since his payoff is maximum, i.e., α′, when Alice also plays p′ = 1
and equals to β′ when Alice plays p′ = 0 which better than the worst possible.
Thus for the initial quantum with parameters given by the eq.(14), NE (1, 1)
is clearly a preferred strategy for both the players giving a unique solution to
the game. Similarly an initial quantum state, for example, with parameters
|a|2 = |d|2 = |c|2 = 5
16
, |b|2 = 1
16
can be found for which (0, 0) is a preferred
strategy pair for both the players giving a unique solution for the game.
3 Summary
We analyzed the game of quantum Battle of Sexes using the approach developed
by Marinatto and Weber [5]. Instead of restricting to the maximally entangled
initial quantum state we considered a general initial quantum state. Exploiting
the additional parameters in the initial state we presented a condition for which
unique solution of the game can be obtained. In particular we addressed the
issues pointed out by Benjamin [6] in Marinatto and Weber [5] quantum version
of the Battle of sexes game. In our approach difference in the payoffs for the
two players corresponding to so called worst-case situation leads to a unique
solution of the game. Our results reduces to that of Marinatto and Weber
under appropriate conditions.
A Appendix
A.0.1 Derivation of Initial Density Matrix
The initial quantum state, i.e. eq. (2), can be used to obtain the required initial
density matrix
ρin = (a |OO〉 + b |OT 〉+ c |TO〉+ d |TT 〉) (a
∗ 〈OO| + b∗ 〈TO|+ c∗ 〈OT |+ d∗ 〈TT |)
(22)
where ∗ stands for complex conjugate. Density matrix can also be written
in the following form:
ρin = |a|
2
|OO〉 〈OO| + ab∗ |OO〉 〈TO|+ ac∗ |OO〉 〈OT |+ ad∗ |OO〉 〈TT |
+ba∗ |OT 〉 〈OO| + |b|2 |OT 〉 〈TO|+ bc∗ |OT 〉 〈OT |+ bd∗ |OT 〉 〈TT |
+ca∗ |TO〉 〈OO| + cb∗ |TO〉 〈TO|+ |c|
2
|TO〉 〈OT |+ cd∗ |TO〉 〈TT |
+da∗ |TT 〉 〈OO| + db∗ |TT 〉 〈TO|+ dc∗ |TT 〉 〈OT |+ |d|
2
|TT 〉 〈TT | (23)
7
A.0.2 Calculation for the Payoffs
¿From eq (4) the final density operator is
ρf = pqIA ⊗ IBρinI
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + p(1− q)IA ⊗ CBρinI
†
A ⊗ C
†
B
+q(1− p)CA ⊗ IBρinC
†
A ⊗ I
†
B + (1− p)(1 − q)CA ⊗ CBρinC
†
A ⊗ C
†
B. (24)
With the help of eq (3) ρf becomes


pqζ + |d|
2
+p(|b|
2
− |d|
2
)
+q(|c|
2
− |d|
2
)
pqǫ+ dc∗
+p(ba∗ − dc∗)
+q(cd∗ − dc∗)
pqω + db∗
+p(ba∗ − db∗)
+q(ca∗ − db∗)
pqξ + da∗
+p(cb∗ − da∗)
+q(cb∗ − da∗)
−pqǫ+ cd∗
+p(ab∗ − cd∗)
+q(dc∗ − cd∗)
−pqζ + |c|
2
+p(|a|
2
− |c|
2
)
+q(|d|2 − |c|2)
−pqξ + cb∗
+p(ad∗ − cb∗)
+q(da∗ − cb∗)
−pqω + ca∗
+p(ac∗ − ca∗)
+q(db∗ − ca∗)
−pqω + bd∗
+p(db∗ − bd∗)
+q (ac∗ − bd∗)
−pqξ + bc∗
+p(da∗ − bc∗)
+q(ad∗ − bc∗)
−pqζ + |b|2
+p(|d|2 − |b|2)
+q(|a|
2
− |b|
2
)
−pqǫ+ ba∗
+p(dc∗ − ba∗)
+q(ab∗ − ba∗)
pqξ + ad∗
+p(cb∗ − ad∗)
+q(bc∗ − ad∗)
pqω + ac∗
+p(ca∗ − ac∗)
+q(bd∗ − ac∗)
pqǫ+ ab∗
+p(cd∗ − ab∗)
+q(ba∗ − ab∗)
pqζ + |a|
2
+p(|c|
2
− |a|
2
)
+q(|b|
2
− |a|
2
)


where we defined
ǫ = ab∗ − ba∗ − cd∗ + dc∗
ζ = |a|
2
− |b|
2
− |c|
2
+ |d|
2
ω = ac∗ − bd∗ − ca∗ + db∗
ξ = ad∗ − bc∗ − cb∗ + da∗
and the payoff functions (the mean values of these operators, i.e., $A(p, q) =
Trace[PAρf ] and $B(p, q) =Trace[PBρf ]) using eqs. (24, 5,6) become:
$A(p, q) = p[q(α+ β − 2γ)(|a|
2
− |b|
2
− |c|
2
+ |d|
2
)
+(γ − β) |a|
2
+ (α− γ) |b|
2
+ (β − γ) |c|
2
+ (γ − α) |d|
2
]
+q[(γ − β) |a|
2
+ (β − γ) |b|
2
+ (α− γ) |c|
2
+(γ − α) |d|
2
] + α |d|
2
+ γ |c|
2
+ γ |b|
2
+ β |a|
2
(25)
$B(p, q) = q[p(α+ β − 2γ)(|a|
2
− |b|
2
− |c|
2
+ |d|
2
)
+(γ − α) |a|
2
+ (α− γ) |b|
2
+ (β − γ) |c|
2
+ (γ − β) |d|
2
]
+p[(γ − α) |a|
2
+ (β − γ) |b|
2
+ (α− γ) |c|
2
+(γ − β) |d|
2
] + β |d|
2
+ γ |c|
2
+ γ |b|
2
+ α |a|
2
(26)
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The above equations leads to the eqs. (7,8) in terms of quantities defined by
eqs. (9).
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